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Sarah P.Bradley*

Conflict of Interest, Duress and
Unconscionability in Quebec Civil Law:
Comment on "The Origins of a Coming
Crisis: Renewal of the Churchill Falls
Contract"

As Professor James Feehan and archivist-historian Melvin Baker
describe the circumstances in which the fateful renewal provision of the
1969 Churchill Falls hydro contract was negotiated, they suggest that the
legal doctrines of conflict of interest or economic duress might offer a
basis upon which the contract, or perhaps the renewal provision, could
be impugned. In addition to interesting historical insights, their analysis
offers the intriguing possibility that the government of Newfoundland
may yet succeed in its long-standing battle to rid itself of its obligations
under the grossly disadvantageous Churchill Falls contract.
Whether by design or by fate, the Churchill Falls contract, together
with the corporate structure of the Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation
("CFLCo"), has proven remarkably resistant to Newfoundland's efforts to
repatriate the bounty of one of the world's largest hydro-electric generating
facilities. Successive provincial governments and some of Canada's
finest legal minds have grappled with the issue, so far without success.
Hydro-Qudbec, for its part, has always staunchly and effectively defended
the contract as one that was fairly negotiated between sophisticated
commercial parties with ample legal and business advice.
The legal disputes over the contract began over thirty years ago, arising
only a few years after the Churchill Falls facility became operational. It
is interesting to note however, that the Newfoundland government never
directly attacked the contract itself. Newfoundland's first challenges to
the contract were political, rather than legal, in nature. When its political
options had been exhausted, Newfoundland's first legal challenge to
the contract was launched in the mid-1970s, when it sought a judicial
declaration that it was entitled to additional power from the Churchill Falls
plant for use within the province under the statutory lease it had granted
to CFLCo. This action was defeated at all levels of court.' Subsequently,

*
Assistant Professor, Dalhousie Law School, with thanks to Carine Taza and Maxime-Arnaud
Keable for their able civil law research assistance.
1. Newfoundland (Attorney General)v. Churchill Falls (Labrador)Corp. Ltd., [1988] S.C.J. No.
53; [1988] 1 S.C.R. 1085; 86 N.R. 1; 70 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 126; 9 A.C.W.S. (3d) 448, affirming [1985]
N.J. No. 80; 56 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 91; 34 A.C.W.S. (2d) 54 (Nfld. C.A.), affirming [1983] N.J. No. 142;
49 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181; 21 A.C.W.S. (2d) 326 (Nfld. S.C. T.D.).
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Newfoundland attempted to expropriate the Churchill River water rights
from CFLCo by enacting the Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act
1980.2 The constitutionality of this Act was upheld by the Newfoundland
Court of Appeal,3 but the Supreme Court of Canada struck it down as ultra
vires of the Newfoundland legislature.4 Since that time, there have been no
further legal challenges, but the perceived unfairness of the Churchill Falls
contract remains at the forefront ofNewfoundland's political consciousness,
representing for many Newfoundlanders the epitome of the exploitation
of the province and its people by outsiders, particularly the province of
Quebec and the federal government. The contract continues to be a hotbutton topic in Newfoundland nearly forty years after its execution in part
because of the ongoing nature of the province's obligations, which see
hundreds of millions of dollars flowing almost literally from the Churchill
River into the coffers of Hydro-Qudbec each year.
The factual circumstances described by Feehan and Baker raise
the prospect of new avenues of legal argument by which the renewal
provision of the contract might be impugned. Their research reveals that
the renewal provision was inserted at the eleventh hour in the negotiations,
at a time when CFLCo was facing imminent bankruptcy. They point out
that because the province of Quebec refused to allow CFLCo to transport
power across its territory to other markets, Hydro-Qudbec was the only
possible purchaser of power from the Churchill Falls site. Additionally,
they highlight the fact that the president of Hydro-Qudbec insisted on
being appointed to CFLCo's board of directors, putting him in a position
to know exactly how close CFLCo was to collapse when Hydro-Qudbec
demanded additional concessions, including the twenty-five-year renewal
provision, in the final stages of negotiation. Facts such as these call into
question the fairness and validity of the agreement.
Counterbalancing this intuitive reaction however, is the fact that courts
rarely vary or refuse to enforce commercially negotiated contracts. The
reliable enforcement of such contracts is integral to the functioning of a
free-market economy, allowing businesspeople to negotiate agreements
and structure their dealings as they see fit, thereby facilitating business
efficiency, economic activity and growth. Nevertheless, Canadian
courts have the jurisdiction to refuse to enforce a commercial contract,
2.
3.
No.
4.
No.

S.N. 1980, c. 40.
Reference re: Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act 1980 (Newfoundland), [1982] N.J.
8; 134 D.L.R. (3d) 288; 36 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 273; 14 A.C.W.S. (2d) 74 (Nfld. C.A.).
Reference re: Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act 1980 (Newfoundland), [1984] S.C.J.
16; [1984] 1 S.C.R. 297; 8 D.L.R. (4th) 1; 53 N.R. 268; J.E. 84-427; 47 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 125; 25

A.C.W.S. (2d) 345.
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vary its terms, or declare it void on a number of grounds, including
unconscionability and duress.
A provision in the 1969 Churchill Falls contract attoms to the laws
of Qudbec. In accordance with this provision, the governance and
interpretation of the contract is to be carried out pursuant to the laws of
Qudbec, and any disputes under the contract are to be adjudicated by the
Qudbec courts, subject to ordinary rights of appeal.
Unconscionability, undue influence and duress are inherently equitable
doctrines, incorporated over the centuries into the common law of contract.
These doctrines, familiar in Canada's common law jurisdictions, are not
directly applicable in the civil law jurisdiction of Qu6bec, where matters
of contract are governed by the Civil Code of Qudbec ("CCQ").5
Notwithstanding the differences of form and provenance however,
both the common law and the civil law offer relief to contracting parties
who have entered into agreements under duress, or in grossly unfair
circumstances. The nature of this relief in each legal system is discussed
below, followed by an analysis of the duties that the directors of CFLCo
owed to the corporation, and whether these duties may have been
breached.
Additional matters that are relevant to a legal analysis of this case
include whether historical laws or the law as it has been amended over the
years will apply to the matter, and the effect of the passage of time on the
availability of legal remedies. These matters, including the common law
doctrine of laches and its civil law equivalent are also discussed below.
The civil law requirementof goodfaith vs. the common law doctrine of
unconscionability
In civil law jurisdictions generally, the foundation of the law and all legal
principles is a written code, which addresses matters typically addressed
by statute in common law jurisdictions, as well as matters typically not
addressedby statute in common lawjurisdictions, including the fundamental
tenets of property and contract law. This code is interpreted by judges in
the course of adjudication and by academics in the preparation of articles
and treatises. When applying the legal rules set out in the code to the facts
of a particular case, civil law judges are strongly influenced by earlier
judicial decisions, though these earlier decisions are not considered to be
a source of law as they are in the common law system, and are not strictly
binding. The interpretation of the code described by legal academics
is also often considered by civil law judges, though it is typically less
5.

S.Q. 1991, c. 64.
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influential than earlier judicial interpretations. In this manner, civil law
systems attempt to ensure that like cases will be tried alike, and that the
application of the code will be reasonably predictable.
In Quebec, the CCQ does not recognize the common law doctrines of
unconscionability or duress, per se, but rather uses the concepts of good
faith and consent vitiated by fear to achieve similar purposes. With respect
to general relief from unfair contracts, the rules of the civil law system are
considerably more restrictive than they are under common law, which has
developed voluminous jurisprudence on the subject of unconscionability.
Under the CCQ, where one party is a minor or under a legal disability,
special protection is available in the form of the doctrine of lesion,
described below. As between sui juris parties, however, relief on the basis
of unfairness is generally not available. The CCQ does contain a general
requirement that contracts are to be negotiated and carried. out in good
faith:
Art. 6. Every person is bound to exercise his civil rights in good
faith.
Art. 7. No right may be exercised with the intent of injuring another
or in an excessive and unreasonable manner which is contrary to the
requirements of good faith.
Art. 1375. The parties [to a contract] shall conduct themselves in
good faith both at the time the obligation is created and at the time it
is performed or extinguished.
Despite these requirements however, the CCQ does not provide any
specific remedy where a contract has not been negotiated or carried out in
good faith. Rather, bad faith is required in order to invoke certain specific
remedies. For example, as discussed more fully below, the proof of bad
faith can be persuasive in demonstrating a defect of consent, such as fear.
In the common law system, courts of equity and common law have
long been willing to refuse to enforce a contract as a result of unfair
overreaching in the negotiation process. A modern articulation of the
unconscionability doctrine was that of Lord Denning, M.R. in the 1975
case of Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy,6 where he reviewed a number of related
equitable principles that then allowed courts to grant relief from unfair
contracts, and reconciled these various principles in the following, often
cited passage:

6.

[1975] Q.B. 326, [1974] 3 All E.R. 757 (C.A.).
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Gathering all together, I would suggest that through all these.instances
there runs a single thread. They rest on 'inequality of bargaining
power'. By virtue of it, the English law gives reliefto one who, without
independent advice, enters into a contract upon terms which are
very unfair or transfers property for a consideration which is grossly
inadequate, when his bargaining power is grievously impaired by
reason of his own needs or desires, or by his own ignorance or infirmity,
coupled with undue influences or pressures brought to bear on him by
or for the benefit of the other. When I use the word 'undue' I do not
mean to suggest that the principle depends on proof of any wrongdoing.
The one who stipulates for an unfair advantage may be moved solely
by his own self-interest, unconscious of the distress he is bringing to
the other. I have also avoided any reference to the will of the one being
'dominated' or 'overcome' by the other. One who is in extreme need may
knowingly consent to a most improvident bargain, solely to relieve the
straits in which he finds himself. Again, I do not mean to suggest that
every transaction is saved by independent advice. But the absence of it
may be fatal. With these explanations, I hope this principle will be found
to reconcile the cases.
A number of Canadian cases considered the doctrine in the 1960s and 70s.
In Harry v. Kreutziger, 8 Lambert J.A. considered the principles discussed
in the earlier cases and set out the broader "community standards of
commercial morality test":
In my opinion, questions as to whether use of power was unconscionable,
an advantage was unfair or very unfair, a consideration was grossly
inadequate, or bargaining power was grievously impaired, to select words
from both statements of principle, the Morrison case and the Bundy
case, are really aspects of one single question. That single question
is whether the transaction, seen as a whole, is sufficiently divergent
from community standards of commercial morality that it should be
rescinded.'
Professor Waters, in a discussion of unconscionability, cites an. earlier
source for the "business morality" test:
Unlike the doctrine of undue influence, equity is not concerned in these
situations with whether the mind of one party was overborne by another
so that the victim's true consent was lacking; it asks the question as to
whether, looked at objectively, the transaction in all the circumstances
was sufficiently unconscionable that it cannot be allowed to stand.

7.
8.
9.

[1975] Q.B. 326 at 339 [emphasis added].
(1978), 95 D.L.R. (3d) 231 (B.C.C.A.).
Ibid.at 241 [emphasis added].
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As Professor Sheridan put it, writing in 1957, the question is whether,
given the weakness of one party's bargaining position and the
undervaluewhich he received, "a greateradvantage" was obtainedby
the strongerparty "than the current morality of the ordinary run of
business allows. 0

The Supreme Court of Canada considered the test in Lloyds Bank in the
1992 case of Norberg v. Wynrib. Dealing in that case with a tort claim
between a patient and doctor that raised issues of consent, the Court
examined contractual rules relating to consent and unconscionability. The
court signalled its willingness to remain flexible in its approach to the
unconscionability doctrine:
It may be argued that an unconscionable transaction does not, in fact,
vitiate consent: the weaker party retains the power to give real consent
but the law nevertheless provides relief on the basis of social policy. This
may be more in line with Lord Denning's formulation of "inequality of
bargaining power" in Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Bundy, supra, when one takes

into account his statement that it is not necessary to establish that the will
of the weaker party was "dominated" or "overcome" by the other party.
But whichever way one approachesthe problem, the result is the same:
on grounds of publicpolicy, the legal effectiveness of certaintypes of
contractswill be restrictedor negated."

Thus, Canadian common law courts remain willing to rescind contracts
between parties whose relationship is one of significant power imbalance,
where the contractual terms are unfairly advantageous to the stronger
party. This imbalance has been found to exist in cases where individuals
have entered into contracts for rescue services, 12 a land sale transaction
from an unsophisticated vendor to a businessman without legal advice, 3
a mortgage entered into by an elderly widow without legal advice,' 4 and
the sale of a fishing vessel and license by an unsophisticated fisher to a
sophisticated businessperson with limited legal advice"5 ; but such an
imbalance was not found to exist in a case involving the purchase of Crown
land by a corporation, where the corporation had paid over $1 million as

10. "Banks, Fiduciary Obligations and Unconscionable Transactions" (1986), 65 Can. Bar Rev. 37
at 48-49 [emphasis added].
I1. [1992] 2 S.C.R. 226 at 250 (La Forest J.) [emphasis added].
12. The Port Caledonia,[1903] P.184.
13. Waters v. Donnelly (1884), 9 O.R. 391 (Ch.), cited with approval in Norberg v. Wynrib, supra
note 11.
14. Morrison v. CoastFinanceLtd (1965), 55 D.L.R. (2d) 710 (B.C.C.A.).
15. Harry v. Kreutziger supra note 8.
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part payment, but was unable to complete the transaction, and the Crown
retained the deposit as forfeit.' 6
Thus, though considerably broader than the remedies available in
the civil law system, the common law system has evolved a threshold of
fairness for the doctrine of unconscionability that requires a significant
disparity of power as well as substantively unfair terms.
If the negotiation of the Churchill Falls contract were to be tried on
the basis that there was a lack of good faith, it is doubtful that any remedy
would be available under the CCQ. Even if the common law doctrine of
unconscionability were applied to the case, to establish that the requisite
disparity of power existed between the representatives of CFLCo and
Hydro-Qudbec would be very difficult, given the level of sophistication of
the parties, their commercial and legal expertise and the protracted nature
of their negotiations, though establishing the unfairness of the terms of the
contract may be less difficult. It is possible that the "commercial morality"
test set out in earlierjurispurdence, 7 might be stretched to take into account
the conflict of interest inherent in Hydro-Qudbec's presence on CFLCo's
board and the eleventh-hour amendments to the renewal provision, but
such a finding would represent an expansion of the doctrine as it has been
applied in Canada to date.
The civil law concept of vitiation of consent by economicfear vs. the
common law doctrine of economic duress
It is a reality of business life that it is often to the advantage of one party
to exploit, another party's weakness or neediness, and such commercial
pressure is common in mercantile negotiations. However, both the common
law and the civil law will provide relief to a contracting party that has been
subject to "undue pressure," duress, or circumstances that create a degree
of fear so significant that it vitiates consent. This relief is based upon the
principle of mutuality of intention that provides the foundation of contract
law in both legal systems.
Under the CCQ, contracts can be voided on the basis that the consent
of one of the parties has been vitiated. One of the specific remedies
available is relief for a contracting party who has entered into a contract in
circumstances of duress that are analogous to the common law doctrine of
economic duress. The general power to contract is set out in art. 1385:

16. Dimensionallnvestment Ltd. v. Canada, [1968] S.C.R. 93.
17. Harryv. Kreutziger, supranote 8.
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1385. A contract is formed by the sole exchange of consents between
persons having capacity to contract...
This general power is modified by the subsequent art. 1399 which sets
out the three principal arguments which can be used to have a contract
annulled 8 on the grounds that it was entered into without consent:
1399. Consent may be given only in a free and enlightened manner.
It may be vitiated by error, fear or lesion.
In art. 1399, "error" refers to cases of fraud, misrepresentation and
mistake. "Lesion" refers to a doctrine similar to the common law doctrine
of abuse of power or abuse of authority. Lesion is a concept that is applied
exclusively to minors or to persons under a legal disability who have
suffered contractual exploitation, and is not generally available to legally
competent adults. 19
The concept in art. 1399 that "fear" can vitiate consent is applied in a
manner akin to the common law doctrine of duress. It is expanded upon
in art. 1402, which makes it clear that the fear of a serious injury to one's
property can be sufficient to vitiate consent, if the fear is induced by a
threat that is known to the other party:
1402. Fear of serious injury to the person or property of one of the
parties vitiates consent given by that party where the fear is induced by
violence or threats exerted or made by or known to the other party...
The degree of injury sufficient to constitute "serious injury" for the
20
purposes of art. 1402 was considered by professors Langevin and Vzina,
who describe a test with both objective and subjective elements. They
suggest that a court will consider the seriousness of the injury that is feared
objectively, but will. also take into consideration the seriousness of that
injury with respect to the age, sex, characteristis and general condition of
the person in question. They suggest that a court will inquire objectively

18. The remedy of annulment is set out in art. 1407: "A person whose consent is vitiated has the
right to apply for annulment of the contract; in the case of error occasioned by fraud, of fear or of
lesion, he may, in addition to annulment, also claim damages or, where he prefers that the contract be
maintained, apply for a reduction of his obligation equivalent to the damages he would be justified in
claiming."
19. CCQ art. 1405: "Except in the cases expressly provided by law, lesion vitiates consent only in
respect of minors and persons of full age under protective supervision."
20. Obligations et contrats, Collection de droit 2007-2008, tcole du Barreau du Quebec, vol.5.
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into whether a reasonable person with the same characteristics and in the
same circumstances would have feared a serious injury.2 '
With respect to the question of the degree of fear that is required to
vitiate consent under art. 1402, professors Didier Lluelles and Benoit
Moore2 2 have advanced a theory that "l'dtat de n6cessit6 circonstantielle,"
or a state of circumstantial necessity, is required. They suggest that
circumstantial necessity arises where circumstances are such that a party
has no choice but to enter the contract: circumstances so compelling that
the party has not entered into the contract voluntarily. Professors Lluelle
and Moore thus seem to have arrived at an interpretation of art. 1402 that
is very similar to the common law doctrine of economic duress enunciated
z3
by the Privy Council in the 1980 case of Pau On v. Lau Yiu Long.
In Pau On v. Lau Yiu Long, the court considered whether English law
recognized a category of duress known as "economic duress," and the
question of the degree of pressure that would be required to constitute
"undue pressure" in such a case. Lord Scarman expressed the view that
economic duress was a valid claim in English law, but made it clear that
the degree of economic duress had to be sufficiently strong to render the
party's consent effectively involuntary. He stated:
Duress, in whatever form it takes, is a coercion of the will so as to
vitiate consent... [I]n a contractual situation, commercial pressure is not
enough... [I]t is material to enquire whether the person alleged to have
been coerced did or did not make protest; whether, at the time he was
allegedly coerced into making the contract, he did or did not have any
alternative course open to him such as an adequate legal remedy; whether
he was independently advised; and whether after entering the contract
he took steps to avoid it... [T]here is nothing contrary to principle in
recognizing economic duress as a factor which may render a contract
voidable, provided always that the basis of such recognition is that it
must amount to a coercion of will, which vitiates consent. It must be
shown that the payment made or the contract entered into was not a
voluntary act. 24

This acknowledgment of the legitimacy of claims of economic duress at
common law was followed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Stott v. Merit
25 where Finlayson J.A. echoed the requirement
Investment Corporation,

21. For an example of an application of this test, see J.J.Joubert Ltge c. Lapierre, [1972] C.S. 476.
22. Droitdes obligations(Montreal: Les dditions Thrmis, 2006).
23. [1980]A.C. 614; [1979] 3 All E.R. 65.
24. [1979] 3 All E.R. 65 at 79 (P.C.) [emphasis added].
25. (1988), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 288 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused 49 D.L.R. (4th) viii.
Cited with approval in Hill v. Forbes, [2007] O.J. No. 2360 (C.A.).
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that the duress in question must be of such magnitude that consent is
vitiated.
Lluelles and Moore go on to discuss the application of art. 1402 in
situations of economic fear. In their interpretation of the article, where
one party to a contract has clearly taken advantage of the fragile economic
situation of the other, for example, by imposing an extraordinary price or
particularly onerous requirements, and the economically fragile party has
agreed to the contract on the basis of fear, the latter party could argue that
their consent was vitiated pursuant to art. 1402.
Similarly, scholars Jobin and Vdzina point out that a mere relationship
of economic dependence is insufficient to create a defect of consent based
on fear.26 Their interpretation of art. 1402 is that something greater is
required, such as a threat in the course of business negotiations to refuse to
carry out an existing obligation. They liken the behaviour that is required
to invoke art. 1402 in economic circumstances to "economic violence."
The CCQ provides an additional hurdle for a party alleging that its
consent has been vitiated by fear. In addition to the provisions of art. 1402,
art. 1404 provides that the fact that a party has entered into a contract out
of fear will not be sufficient to vitiate that party's consent if the other party
to the contract is acting in good faith:
Article 1404: Consent to a contract the object of which is to deliver
the person making it from fear of serious injury is not vitiated where
the other contracting party, although aware of the state of necessity, is
acting in good faith.
Thus, the fear of serious injury on the part of one party must be accompanied
by bad faith on the part of the other party in order for the fearful party's
consent to be vitiated. The onus to prove this bad faith rests with the
27
person alleging it, as good faith is generally presumed under the CCQ.
Some courts have interpreted this provision to mean that the cause of the

26. Jean-Louis Baudouin & Pierre-Gabriel Jobin, Les Obligations,6e dd., (Cowansville, QC: Yvon
Blais, 2005) at 310.
27. Art. 2805: "Good faith is always presumed, unless the law expressly requires that it be proved."
This has been reiterated by the Quebec courts, which have repeatedly held that he who alleges bad faith
must prove it: "Celui qui allgue mauvaise foi doit laprouver." See Chaputc. Romain, [1955] R.C.S.
834; Motors Insurance Corp. c. Tangorra, (C.S., 2003-02-07), AZ-50161525, J.E. 2003-640, [2003]
J.Q. No. 559 (Q.L.); Confection Jim enr c. Groupe Commerce (C.S., 2002-08-28), AZ-50142333, B.E.
2002BE-754; Valla-Gaumondc. Compagnie des chemins defer nationaux du Canada, (C.S., 199803-26), AZ-98026276, B.E. 98BE-479; Godbout c. Entreprises J.G.E Fiore inc., (C.S., 1994-10-25),
AZ-94021709, J.E. 94-1814; Lambert c. Lafond, (C.Q.,. 1994-07-14), AZ-96121003, [1996] R.L. 14.
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fear must "emanate from the co-contractant or from a third party at the co28
contractant's knowledge."
In this respect, the civil law remedy for economic duress is analogous
to the common law doctrine, which also requires some undue, illegitimate
or illegal action on the part of the party who is alleged to have placed the
other in circumstances of economic duress. In Stott v. Merit Investment
Corporationthe Ontario Court of Appeal discussed the requirement that
the pressure exerted by the stronger party must be "illegitimate," stating:
The term "economic duress" as used in recent cases, particularly
in. England, is no more than a recognition that in our modem life the
individual is subject to societal 'pressures which can be every bit as
effective, if improperly used, as those flowing from threats of physical
abuse. It is an expansion in kind but not class of practices that the law
already recognizes as unacceptable such as those resulting from undue
influence or from persons in authority. But not all pressure, economic
or otherwise, is recognized as constituting duress. It must be a pressure
which the law does not regard as legitimate and it must be applied
to such a degree as to amount to "a coercion of the will". to use an
expressionfound in English authorities, or it must place the party to
whom the pressure is directedin a position where he has no "realistic
alternative" but to submit to it, to adopt the suggestion of Professor
Waddams (S.M. Waddams, The Law of Contract (2nd ed., 1984), at p.
376 et seq.). Duress has the effect of vitiating consent and an agreement
obtained through duress is voidable at the instance of the party subjected
to the duress unless by another agreement or through conduct, either
express or implied, he affirms the29 impugned contract at a time when he
is no longer the victim of duress.
In Stott the court held that economic pressure, even pressure that could
not be recognized in law as legitimate, was insufficient to establish the
defence of duress in that case, because the court found that the plaintiff
had other practical alternatives, and could have repudiated the contract
entered into, but did not.3 °
Thus, the degree of economic duress required to render a contract
voidable at common law, particularly in the commercial context, is high.
There is an onus on the party pleading economic duress to prove that the
stronger party exerted pressure that was not only of sufficient magnitude
that it vitiated the weaker party's consent, but that was also illegitimate

28. Schmiklc. 2819104.Canadainc., [2007] Q.J. No. 10121 (Que. S.C.).
29. Supra note 25 at 305 [emphasis added].
30. See, however, WH. Violette Ltd. and Violette Motors Ltd. v. FordMotor Co. of CanadaLtd.
(1980), 31 N.B.R.(2d) 394; 75 A.P.R. 394.
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or unlawful.3 This degree of pressure has been found in cases where a
creditor or a person entitled to the benefit of a contract has been pressured
into accepting something less than he is entitled to receive by law, or
coerced into paying something more than he was otherwise obliged to
pay.3 2 However, the requisite degree of pressure has not been found where
an insurer refused to release the funds due for a destroyed building until
the plaintiffs agreed to a settlement, effectively "starving the plaintiffs
into submission"3 3 , or where economic duress was found to exist, but the
pressure exerted was not proven to be illegitimate.34 Canadian courts
typically also consider the four factor test set out in Pau On v. Lau Yiu
Long,35 i.e., whether the party protested at the time of entering into
the contract, whether there was an alternative course open to .the party,
whether the party was independently advised, and whether, after entering
the contract, the party took steps to avoid it.36
There are few Quebec cases where the court has found that the consent
of a party to a commercial contract was vitiated by economic fear. One
37
early example is the case of Vinet c. Canadian Light and Power Co.
In that case, the plaintiff, Vinet, was a contractor who had undertaken
several construction projects for the defendant. Midway through one
project, the defendant approached Vinet and had him sign an agreement
by which he agreed to a particular method of calculation of his price for
the work he was performing. Vinet recognized that the agreement was
disadvantageous to him, but was told by the defendant that if he did not
sign, then all further payments to him would be stopped, which would
cause his financial ruin. The court found that Vinet's consent had been
vitiated by economic fear, describing the circumstances under which
Vinet had entered into the contract as "under...coercion, violence and fear

31. Kirsch v. British Columbia (Insurance Corp. of British Columbia), [1987] B.C.J. No. 2437, 31
C.C.L.I. 148"(C.A.), leave to appeal dismissed [1988] S.C.C.A. No. 129; Gordon v. Roebuck(1992), 9
O.R. (3d) I (C.A.).
32. See, for example, WH. Vlolette Ltd. and Violette Motors Ltd v. Ford Motor Co. of Canada
Ltd, supranote 30; Knutson v. The Bourkes Syndicate, [1941] S.C.R. 419; Peter Kiewit Sons'Co. v.
Eakins ConstructionLtd., [1960] S.C.R. 361, Cartwright J. at 380-81; North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd.
v. Hyundai ConstructionCo. Ltd., [1979] 3 W.L.R. 419 (Q.B.); The Atlantic Baron, [1978] 3 All E.R.
1170; Halterm Ltd. v. Canada(NationalHarboursBoard), [1980] F.C.J. No. 135 (T.D.).
33. Kirsch v. British Columbia (Insurance Corp. of British Columbia), supranote 31.
34. Gordon v. Roebuck, supra note 3 1.
35. Supra note 24.
36. See D. & C. Builders Ltd. v. Rees, [1965] 2 Q.B. 617; Universe Tankships Inc. of Monrovia
v. Int'l Transport Workers'Federation,[1982] 2 All E.R. 67; and North Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd. v.
Hyundai ConstructionCo. Ltd., supranote 32; Gordon v. Roebuc, supranote 3 1; Levy v. Levy, [ 1996]
O.J. No. 203, aff'd [1999] O.J. No. 1140 (C.A.).
37. (1918), 54 C.S. 134 (Cour de rdvision).
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[created by] the defendant, who threatened...to suspend his payments,
which [would] have had [the] effect to force him into liquidation."
In the more recent case of J.J. Joubert Ltie c. Lapierre,35 the court
held that an employee who had agreed to acquire the equipment and
clientele of his employer under threat of dismissal was entitled to have
the contract annulled on the grounds that his consent had been vitiated by
economic fear. The employer's purpose was to have the plaintiff become
an independent contractor so that the employer could rid itself of its
employees' union. In considering whether the plaintiff had experienced
sufficient fear of serious injury to vitiate his consent, the court in Joubert
emphasized the importance of a subjective analysis. The court considered
the dependent relationship that existed between the employee and the
employer and the plaintiff's particular circumstances. In considering what
was required to establish fear sufficient to vitiate consent, the court also
stated that simple pressure to-enter into a contract was not enough, but that
illegitimate threats were required, whether such threats were illegitimately
39
made, or made in order to further illegitimate goals.
Absent the element of outright threat or abuse of rights 4° however,
Quebec courts have interpreted art. 1402 very strictly in commercial
contexts. In the case of Verdi c. Socigtt des alcools du Quebec, 4' the court
refused to find that the plaintiff's consent had been vitiated on the basis
of economic fear.. In that case, Verdi, a wine producer, had entered into a
contract with the Socidt6 des Alcools du Quebec ("SAQ") to market and sell
Verdi's wines. The contract between Verdi and SAQ contained a provision
allowing the SAQ to withdraw from its obligations under the contract if
sales of Verdi's wine were unsatisfactory. After the commencement of
their relationship under the contract, SAQ determined that the sales were
unsatisfactory and invoked its right to withdraw from the contract, leaving
Verdi with over $1.5 million in merchandise that he was unable to sell and
placing him in dire financial circumstances. Following some negotiations,
Verdi and the SAQ then entered into another contract for the sale of the
excess merchandise, on terms substantially less favourable to Verdi. Verdi
later brought an action to have the latter contract annulled on the basis that
his consent had been vitiated by economic fear and that SAQ had acted in

38. [1972] C.S. 476.
39. Vincent Karim, Les obligations: volume 1 (art. 1371 6 1496 C.C.Q.) (Montreal: Wilson &
Lafleur, 2002) at 210.
40. Which are dealt with separately in art. 1403: "Fear induced by the abusive exercise of a right or
power or by the threat of such exercise vitiates consent."
41. [1996] J.Q. no. 2742; C.S. 1989-03-14,'appeal dismissed [1996] A.Q. no. 2742, J.E. 96-1840
(C.A.).
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bad faith in its negotiations. Verdi pleaded that at the time of entering into
the second contract, he was in such a fragile economic situation that he had
no other choice but to enter the contract with the SAQ.
The Quebec Court of Appeal rejected Verdi's claim of economic fear
on the basis of a subjective analysis of his circumstances, holding that
Verdi was an experienced businessman who had entered into contracts
of equal significance on many prior occasions. The court also held that
the onus was upon Verdi to prove that the SAQ had acted in bad faith and
that this onus had not been met. Upon an examination of the evidence,
the Court stated that it was unable to find that the SAQ had exercised
illegitimate threats in its negotiations with Verdi.
In the case of Valla-Gaumondc. Cie des chemins defer nationauxdu
Canada,42 the Quebec Superior Court considered the application of a sixtyone-year old pharmacist of limited business expertise who had entered
into a lease assignment agreement in order to avoid otherwise certain
bankruptcy. The pharmacist's business was failing, and her landlord,
Canadian National Railways, demanded the sum of $25,000 in order to
allow her to assign her lease to a new tenant. Without the permission to
assign the lease, she faced imminent bankruptcy, so she paid the amount
demanded and then brought an action to have the contract annulled on
the basis that her consent was vitiated by economic fear and that CN had
acted in bad faith by exploiting her circumstances when it demanded the.
$25,000.
The Superior Court found that CN had not acted in bad faith. The court
did not go so far as to offer a definition of bad faith, but stated that bad faith
requires more than merely negotiating an agreement that promotes one's
rights. The Court quoted a dictionary definiton of good faith (roughly
translated) as "sincerity, honest behaviour and straightforwardness based
on the certainty of acting within the framework of one's legal rights."43 The
court analyzed the plaintiff's economic fear subjectively, and considered
the choice she faced either to agree to pay the $25,000 demanded or
to face personal bankruptcy. The Court held that although bankruptcy
is an unpleasant experience, it was not a shameful one, and that the
plaintiff's fear of bankruptcy was not sufficient to vitiate her consent to the
agreement. In the course of its decision, the Court explicitly mentioned
the policy consideration that it should promote the stability of contracts
when possible.

42. [1998] A.Q. no 881 (Que. S.C.).
43. Ibid. at para. 31. Trahan J. cited the definition given in the DictionnaireHachette (Paris, 1991):
"lasincritd, la droiture dans la mani&re d'agir fondbe sur la certitude d'etre dans son bon droit."
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It would therefore appear that there are two elements that must be
proven by the plaintiff who seeks to invoke the provisions of art. 1402
in the context of commercial contracts: an objectively reasonable fear of
dire economic consequences, possibly beyond mere bankruptcy; and proof
of bad faith or illegitimate threats on the part of the adverse party. The
Quebec courts have demonstrated that these tests are difficult to establish
in the commercial context, particularly between sophisticated and welladvised parties. In the context of the Churchill Falls contract, it is uncertain
whether CFLCo's fear of imminent bankruptcy would be deemed to be
sufficient to vitiate its consent. CFLCo's ability to prove Hydro-Qudbec's
bad faith is also doubtful. It is possible in this case that the court would
take Lessard's conflict of interest into account when considering whether
Hydro-Qurbec acted in bad faith in the course of the negotiations, but
without question, this would be a difficult onus to meet.
Even at common law, it would be difficult for CFLCo to establish it
executed the Churchill Falls contract under economic duress. As discussed
above, the threshold issue at common law is whether the pressure exerted
by Hydro-Qudbec was sufficient to constitute "undue pressure," and the
application of the four-factor Pau On test. Hydro-Qu6bec's knowledge
of the dire economic circumstances of NFLCo at the time the renewal
provision was amended and CLFCo's lack of alternative development
opportunities would be relevant to both determinations. It may be that if
Hydro-Qurbec knew of CFLCo's imminent bankruptcy and intentionally
prolonged the negotiations until CFLCo had no effective choice but to
*enter into the contract, and if a court deemed this to be an illegitimate
-exercise of Hydro-Qudbec's superior bargaining power, that this could
constitute "undue pressure." With respect to the four-factor test, it is not
clear from the evidence presented by Feehan and Baker how this analysis
would proceed. For example, it is not clear whether the negotiators for
CFLCo protested the inclusion of the renewal provision or to what extent
such a protest may have been feasible. It is also not clear at law when
a contracting party might be expected to take steps to avoid a renewal
provision; whether it must be "avoided" at the time of contract, or at the
time of renewal. The precise application of the common law doctrines to
the facts of this case is therefore not entirely clear.
The duties of corporate directors
Though the legal battles over the Churchill Falls contract have largely been
championed by the Newfoundland government and its agents, as a matter
law, the party that has directly experienced losses arising from the terms of
the contract is CFLCo itself. As such, the company may have had a claim
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against its directors for breach of their fiduciary duties to the corporation.
The board of directors as a group may be liable if they were negligent in
approving such an improvident contract, and Lessard in particular may be
liable for voting to approve the contract in circumstances where his duties
to CFLCo were in conflict with his duties as a director of Hydro-Qudbec
and for using information he acquired as a director of CFLCo to benefit
Hydro-Qudbec. CFLCo is a corporation incorporated under the Canada
Business CorporationsAct," and as such, its directors are obliged to
comply with the duties imposed on them by that Act and at common law.
Directors of a corporation are in a fiduciary relationship with the
corporation, and are obliged to carry out their duties to the corporation
"honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the
corporation. '45 This rule generally prohibits all forms of conflict of
interest, 46 and may preclude directors from acting on the boards of
directors of multiple companies, particularly those in direct competition
with one another, or where acting as a director of one company will harm
the other.47 It is entirely possible, perhaps even likely, that Lessard acted
in breach of his duty of loyalty to CFLCo by simultaneously acting as an
officer and director of Hydro-Qudbec during at a time when the companies
were engaged in such intense and adversarial negotiations.
Directors are also required to "exercise the care, diligence and
skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable
circumstances."4 Very few claims succeed against directors on the ground
of breach of duty of care in Canada however, because Canadian courts are
traditionally quite deferential to directors of business corporations with
respect to matters of "business judgment,' 49 though there have been a few
where directors have been found liable for negligent performance of their
duties. 0 The standard of deference of the courts to directors in matters
44. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44.
45. Ibid., s.122(l)(a).
46. In Aberdeen Railway Co. v. Blaikie Bros. (1854), [1843-60] All E.R. 249 at 252, Lord Cranworth
set out the guiding equitable principle that "no one, having such duties to discharge, shall be allowed to
enter into engagements in which he has, or can have, a personal interest conflicting or which possibly
may conflict, with the interests of those whorri he is bound to protect." For a modem discussion of the
duty, see CanadianAero Services Limited v. O'Malley et al., [1974] S.C.R. 592.
47. See, for example, Abbey Glen Property Corporation v. Stumborg et al. (1976), 65 D.L.R. (3d)
235; aff'd (1978), 4 B.L.R. 113 (Alta. S.C.A.D.).
48. CanadaBusiness CorporationsAct, supranote 44. A similar duty is imposed at common law: Re
City EquitableFire InsuranceLtd., [1925] Ch. 457; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Bowley et al.,
[2003] E.W.H.C. 2263 (Comm. Ct.).
49. See for example, Peoples DepartmentStores Inc. v. Wise, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 461.
50. Such cases in Canada are rare, but see Thermadel Foundation v. Third Canadian General
Investment Trust Ltd., [1998] O.R (3d) 749 (C.A.); Smith v. VanGorkom, 448 A.2d 858 (1985 - Del.
SC).
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of business judgment was described by the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Maple Leaf Foods Inc. v. Schneider Corporationin the following terms:
The court looks to see that the directors made a reasonable decision
not a perfect decision. Provided the decision taken is within a range
of reasonableness, the court ought not to substitute its opinion for that
of the board even though subsequent events may have cast doubt on
the board's determination. As long as the directors have selected one
of several reasonable alternatives, deference is accorded to the board's
decision.5
It is therefore open to the courts to examine the question of whether
a particular business decision taken by the directors was reasonable. In
light of the grossly improvident bargain negotiated on behalf of CFLCo,
it may have been possible for a court to find that the directors of CFLCo
did not enter into the 1969 contract reasonably, though the legal and other
.business advice received by the directors throughout the negotiation
process may mitigate against such a finding.
A practical question might be whether there is any point in pursuing
the directors in this case, as it is very unlikely that an of them, or their
estates, would have sufficient resources to make such a claim feasible or
palatable. However, recovery might be possible from at least one director,
Lessard, who, as an officer and director of Hydro-Qudbec, is likely to
have been indemnified by that company for any actions taken by him in
the course of his service.
Additionally claims against the directors for breach of their fiduciary.
obligations could have properly proceeded in the courts ofNewfoundland,
where the common law fiduciary tests would have been applied. Forty
years after the execution of the contract however, such claims would be
subject to the doctrine of laches, which, as discussed below, would be
difficult to overcome.
Applicable law and the consequences of delay
Some forty years have passed since the negotiation and execution of the
Churchill Falls contract. This passage of time raises questions as to the
law that would be applicable to the matter, and whether any claim might
be barred by legal rules requiring actions to be brought within a reasonable
time.

51. (1998), 42 O.R. (3d) 177 at 192 (C.A.), cited with approval in Kerr v. DanierLeather Inc.,
[2007] S.C.J. No. 44 and PeoplesDepartment Stores Inc. v. Wise, supranote 49.
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Applicable law
The question of the applicable law arises because the CCQ has been
amended on a number of occasions since the mid- 1960s, most notably by
the addition of a number of new articles relating to contractual remedies
that were introduced in the 1990s. It is necessary, therefore, to inquire into
whether the laws in effect in the 1960s would apply to the interpretation of
the contract, or those presently in force.
The answer to this query is relatively straightforward, because
when the 1994 amendments were implemented, a number of transitional
provisions were also enacted that clarify that the new articles of the CCQ
are applicable to contracts entered into prior to the implementation of the
reforms. 2
Delay
Perhaps the greatest legal difficulty faced by CFLCo if it should attempt
to challenge the Churchill Falls contract is the effect of the legal rules in
both the common law and the civil law that require cases to be brought to
the courts within a reasonable time. In most common law jurisdictions,
strict time limits for the bringing of actions are also set out in limitations
statutes.
Under the common law, equitable claims such as breach of fiduciary
duty and unconscionability are subject to equitable defences, including
the doctrine of laches, which can bar a claim that is not brought within a
reasonable time. Laches is a form of acquiescence on the part of a party
who is aware of a right of action against another but fails to bring the
action within a reasonable time of its discovery. The purpose of the rule
is to allow people to move forward with their affairs, without concern that
they may be called upon to argue issues from their ancient past or pay
damages for liabilities that were incurred but left unchallenged for a long
period of time.
The leading case on the doctrine is Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Hurd, in
which the Privy Council made it clear that the fact of delay alone is not
enough to invoke the laches doctrine, but that the doctrine also requires

52. Act Respecting the Implementation of the Reform of the Civil Code, S.Q. 1992, c.57. Section 78
provides "The provisions of articles 1407, 1408 and 1421 of the new Code concerning, respectively,
the remedies available to the person whose consent is vitiated, the power granted to the court to
maintain, in certain cases, a contract in respect of which a demand for annulment has been made, and
the presumption of relative nullity of a contract which does not meet the necessary conditions of its
formation, are applicable to contracts formed before I January 1994." Section 79 continues, "[t]he
relative nullity of a contract made before 1 January 1994 may, in the conditions set forth in article 1420
of the new Code, be invoked by the party contracting with the person in whose interest the nullity is
established."
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some corresponding detriment to the other party in the case. As with most
equitable doctrines, the test is flexible in nature, and its application will
depend upon the overall equities of the case. The Privy Council described
the test for laches as follows:
Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy, either b~cause
the party has, by his conduct, done that which might fairly be regarded
as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he
has, though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a
situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy
were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time
and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argumentagainst
relief,which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that
delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitations,
the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially
equitable. Two circumstances, always important in such cases, are, the
length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval,
which might affect either party and cause a balance ofjustice or injustice
53
in taking the one course or the other, so far as relates to the remedy.
Lindsay Petroleum has been followed by the Supreme Court of Canada on
a number of occasions.54
The doctrine of laches will require a consideration of whether the
plaintiff's delay in bringing the action either constitutes acquiescence in
the defendant's conduct, or results in circumstances that that have caused
the defendant to alter their position in reasonable reliance on the plaintiff's
acceptance of the status quo, or otherwise makes the prosecution of the
action unjust. Laches is an inherently flexible doctrine, used for the
purpose of furthering justice as between the parties. In Erlanger v. New
Sombrero PhosphateCo., Lord Blackbum comments:
I have looked in vain for any authority which gives a more distinct and
definite rule than this; and I think, from the nature of the inquiry, it
must always be a question of more or less, depending on the degree of
diligence which might reasonably be required, and the degree of change
which has occurred, whether the balance of justice or injustice is in
favour of granting the remedy or withholding it. The determination of
such a question must largely depend on the turn of mind of those who
have to decide, and must therefore be subject to uncertainty; but that, I
think, is inherent in the nature of the inquiry."1

53.
54.
v. M
55.

(1874), L.R. 5 P.C. 221 at 239-40 (P.C. - Ont.) [emphasis added].
See CanadaTrust Co. v. Lloyd, [1968] S.C.R. 300; Blundon v. Storm, [1972] S.C.R. 135; M (K.)
(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6.
(1878), 3 App. Cas. 1218 (H.L.) at 1279-80.
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Where the doctrine of laches depends upon the acquiescence or neglect
of the party who knows of his cause of action, the date upon which the
party discovers the cause of action is clearly material, as a person cannot
commit laches with respect to a claim he does not know he has, unless
a court determines that he ought to have known it was available. Most
limitations statutes have a similar requirement of "discoverability," with
stipulated time periods running from the date upon which a claim was, or
ought to have been, discovered. 6 A key issue in any laches case therefore,
is when the plaintiff in the case found out that he or she had been injured
or that a cause of action existed against the defendant. It is therefore open
to CFLCo to argue that it did not know of the existence of its possible
equitable claims against the directors until relatively recently, which may
be plausible if the facts revealed by Feehan and Baker were previously
unknown. However, the equities of the case may still favour the directors,
who, after nearly forty years may reasonably have come to rely on CFLCo's
acceptance of the status quo, and organized their affairs accordingly.
In the civil law, the concept of "extinctive prescription" functions in a
similar, though somewhat less flexible way, by extinguishing claims that
are not brought within the prescription period. Article 2922 of the CCQ
provides that "[t]he period for extinctive prescription is 10 years, except
as otherwise fixed by law," and a number of specific prescription periods
follow. Article 2927 sets out the specific prescription for actions to annul a
contract: "[i]n an action in nullity of contract, the prescriptive period runs
from the day the person invoking the cause of nullity becomes aware of
such cause or, in the case of violence or fear, from the day it ceases."
Therefore, unless the findings of Feehan and Baker can be said to
have revealed a cause of action previously unknown to CFLCo, it may be
difficult for the company to justify its delay in bringing any claim relating
to the Churchill Falls contract on any basis recognized by the civil law, as
any fear for its property that may have induced the company to enter into
the contract initially surely ceased shortly after the contract was executed.
It is therefore doubtful at this point whether any contractual remedy is
available to CFLCo.
Conclusion
The Churchill Falls contract is widely regarded as a travesty for
Newfoundland, but CFLCo's legal options now are limited. Feehan and
Baker raise some interesting and perhaps disturbing issues relating to the
negotiation of the 1969 Churchill Falls contract, but unless these issues

56.

See, for example: Limitations Act, S.N.L. 1995, c. L-16.1, s.14.
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can be proven to have revealed to CFLCo a cause of action that it did
not previously know that it had, and that any potential defendant has not
been prejudiced by the delay, any claim that may have been possible is
now likely to be barred by the doctrine of extinctive prescription and/or
laches.
Though a successful legal attack on the Churchill Falls contract
itself seems unlikely to succeed at this point, it is challenging to consider
whether there may be other legal avenues that offer at least the possibility
that Newfoundland may yet be able to repatriate some of the bounty of the
Churchill River. It is interesting to consider, for example, the exclusive
power to govern the production of electrical energy and to tax electrical
generation facilities granted to the provinces by section 92A of the
Constitution. Though these provisions clearly prohibit price and supply
discrimination for power exported from a province to another part of
Canada, as compared with power not exported from the province, they do
not appear to prohibit, for example, provincial limits on the size or output
of electrical generation facilities, or taxation regimes that discriminate
on the basis of whether energy is exported from Canada. Of course, any
action taken by the Newfoundland government in the exercise of its
constitutional powers could not be taken for the purpose of interfering
with Hydro-Qudbec's rights under the Churchill Falls contract. Recalling
the Re Upper Churchill Water Rights Reversion Act 198017 case, those
rights are situate in Quebec and therefore, any act intended to interfere
with them is ultra vires the government of Newfoundland.
In any event, as grossly unfair as the Churchill Falls contract is
considered to be in Newfoundland, there may be little appetite for further
political confrontation over the contract in the province today, considering
the province's recently announced new energy strategy, its unprecedented
prosperity and its ongoing negotiations with Hydro-Qudbec for the
development of electrical generation facilities on the Lower Churchill
River.
Though the factual circumstances described by Feehan and Baker
provide little hope that a legal challenge of the Churchill Falls contract
would succeed in the courts today, they nevertheless illuminate the legal
pitfalls and far-reaching complications which can arise in the context of
the negotiation of any long-term commercial contract. If nothing else,
we can hope that the lessons learned from the negotiation of the Upper
Churchill contract will be to Newfoundland's advantage in its negotiation

57. Supra note 4.
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of the development of the Lower Churchill and the exploitation of its
other natural resources.

